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Over the past decade there have been increasingly common claims that psychiatry is in a “cri-
sis”(Hyman, 2013; Morgan, 2015; Poland and Tekin, 2017). These claims often target the lack of
known or identifiable causal etiologies for psychiatric diseases, suggesting that they are “among
the most intractable enigmas in medicine” (Sullivan et al., 2012, 537). While the intractable na-
ture of these disorders is often associated with their “causal complexity” (Poland and Tekin, 2017,
5), it is not always clear exactly what is meant by this. How should we understand causal com-
plexity in this domain? How does it challenge scientific efforts to understand and explain these
diseases? This paper addresses these questions by examining two main types of causal complexity
in psychiatry. My analysis clarifies what these types of causal complexity are, how they challenge
efforts to understand and explain these disorders, and how scientists are working to overcome these
challenges.
1 Introduction. Over the past decade there have been increasingly common claims that psychi-
atry is in a “crisis”(Hyman, 2013; Morgan, 2015; Poland and Tekin, 2017)–that it is an “embryonic”
and “immature” science that remains in its “early stages” (Hyman, 2010, 155,171) (Hyman, 2013).
According to these views, psychiatry is stuck within a disease framework that is “seriously flawed”
(Poland and Tekin, 2017, 1) and marked by “incredible insecurity” and “nosologic instability” that
are “beyond a full resolution” (Kendler and Zachar, 2008, 370-1). Many of these criticisms tar-
get the lack of known or identifiable causal etiologies for psychiatric disorders. This, of course, is
compared to the relative success that has been enjoyed in identifying such etiologies for various
non-psychiatric or “physical medicine” diseases. It has been suggested that “[p]sychiatric disorders
are among the most intractable enigmas in medicine” and that they are “have been intractable to
approaches that were fruitful in other areas” of medical science (Sullivan et al., 2012, 537). The
intractable nature of these disorders is often associated with their “causal complexity” (Poland
and Tekin, 2017, 5), where this is interpreted in a variety of ways. On one interpretation, causal
complexity is connected with views that the human brain is “the most complex object in the known
universe” due to its large number of neurons and synaptic connections (Hoffecker, 2011, ix). A sec-
ond interpretation suggests that psychiatric disorders are complicated at the level of etiology or in
terms of the causal processes that produce them (Uher and Zwicker, 2017). A third interpretation
suggests that the genetic bases and heritability of mental disorders is complex is ways that we
might not see with other conditions (Lemoine, 2016; Tsuang et al., 2006; Mitchell, 2012).
Despite efforts to provide clarity, it is not always clear exactly what is meant by “causal com-
plexity” and how it leads to the “intractable” nature of these disorders. These points raise a number
of questions. First, how should we understand causal complexity in this domain? Second, if causal
complexity makes sense of the “intractable” and “enigmatic” nature of psychiatric disease, how
exactly does it challenge our scientific efforts to understand and explain them?
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This paper addresses these questions by analyzing two types of causal complexity that are
common in psychiatry and that challenge efforts to understand and explain these disorders. My
analysis clarifies what these types of causal complexity are, how they challenge efforts to understand
and explain psychiatric disease, and how scientists are working to overcome these challenges. This
analysis examines work in psychiatric genetics where genome-wide association studies (GWAS)
have been used to search for genetic causes of disease. I do not claim that genetic factors are
the only relevant (or even the main) causes of these diseases. Instead, I suggest that examining
scientific efforts to identify such causes reveals important types of causal complexity that emerge
in this domain. As will become clear, one main suggestion of this analysis, is that while these
types of complexity are particularly common and troubling in psychiatry, they are actually found
throughout many areas of medicine. The rest of this paper is structured as follows. In section
two, I provide some background on disease causation, including particular causal standards that
ideal diseases are often expected to meet. This should “demystify” psychiatric disease in some
way and indicate that psychiatry is more similar to other subfields of medicine than is commonly
acknowledged.
2 A causal framework for disease: Some background. At a basic level, disease explana-
tion involves a disease phenotype (D) and its causes or causal etiology (C). This set up helps clarify
a common two-step process for discovering new diseases that has been employed from Hippocratic
to modern times. In the first step, a disease phenotype (D) is associated with some symptomology
that reoccurs, with variation, across patients.1 A second step in this process involves identifying
the causal factors (C) or the causal etiology that produces this disease phenotype.2 While various
“physical” or “somatic” diseases have known causal etiologies, most if not all psychiatric condi-
tions are of unknown etiology. In this sense, most psychiatric disorders are stuck at this first stage
of discovery. Researchers have identified the symptomology that they think characterizes these
conditions, but they do not yet know what causes them. This causal information is essential for
ensuring that a disease category is valid–it guides how researchers and physicians classify, explain,
and discover “bona fide” disease traits (Hyman, 2010). Identifying etiology is valuable because
it can be targeted to explain, predict, and control disease occurrence. While symptomology can
suggest palliative treatments that comfort and mask symptoms, it usually cannot suggest curative
measures or inform disease explanation, as both require targeting the root cause of disease.
In this sense, causal etiology serves as a gold standard for many interrelated projects in medicine,
including disease classification, explanation, discovery, and treatment. Unsurprisingly, psychiatric
conditions can face significant scrutiny when their etiologies are unknown. In particular, if the
causal etiology of a purported psychiatric disease is unknown, the “legitimacy” and “validity” of
the disease is often questioned. This is captured by the modern medical view that “if you cannot
explain a distinct and unambiguous etiology for a syndrome, preferably in biological terms, then
you do not have a real disorder” (Kendler, 2012, 1, emphasis original). This is not to say that
the medical community questions whether patients actually experience these symptoms. Instead,
they question whether the disease category associated with these symptoms will remain stable and
unchanged as more is uncovered about its causal etiology (Kendler and Zachar, 2008). Why this
worry? One lesson that diseases have repeatedly taught us is that symptomology is a rough and
unpredictable guide to causal etiology (Hyman, 2010, 161). The repeated presentation of clear-cut
1I follow the custom of referring to both signs and symptoms as “symptomology.”
2For further discussion of this disease discovery process see: (Hucklenbroich, 2014; Ross, 2018).
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symptom clusters across various patients is simply no guarantee that these symptoms all arise from
the same causal process. We see this in cases where the same etiology produces different symptoms
and where different etiologies produce the same symptoms (Ross, forthcoming).3
A main goal of psychiatry is to get to this second step of disease discovery and identify the causal
etiologies of these conditions (Sullivan et al., 2012, 537). One strategy that is used to achieve this
goal involves collecting patients with the same diagnosis and searching among them for the factors
that they have in common and that might be causally responsible for their disease. This involves
starting with some phenotype of interest (D) and then searching backward or causally upstream
to identify its causes (C).4 This basic strategy has been implemented in genome-wide association
studies (GWAS). These studies analyze the genomes of patients with particular psychiatric disorders
in order to identify those gene variants that they all share and that potentially cause these diseases.
Expectations about the type of results these studies should provide have been influenced by an
“ideal” model of disease causation that continues to figure in modern medicine. This ideal model–
sometimes referred to as the “hard” medical model or the “biomedical” model (Kendler, 2012;
Engel, 1977)–originated with nineteenth century germ theory and it contains two main causal
standards (Ross, 2018). First, this model involves a (1a) single cause standard, which maintains
that a particular instance of some disease has one main causal factor. Second, this model also
involves a (2a) shared cause standard, which maintains that all instances of a particular disease
have the same (or some similar) causal process. This model captures the expectation that diseases
should have single, shared causal etiologies.
Although some diseases meet the strict standards captured in this “ideal” model, most do not.
GWAS have provided further evidence for the claim that psychiatric disorders often fail to fit this
model. In particular, these studies have identified two types of causal complexity that capture ways
in which this ideal model breaks down. First, these studies indicate that some psychiatric disorders
are characterized by (1b) multicausality in the sense that each instance of the disease is caused by
many gene variants that work together in aggregate to produce the condition. This finding conflicts
with the single cause standard or monocausal-type picture. Second, these results also suggest that
some psychiatric disorders are (2b) causally heterogeneous in the sense that distinct instances of the
same disease are caused by different combinations of gene variants. This conflicts with the shared
cause standard, as different overlapping combinations of causes are capable of producing the same
disease.
This breakdown provides a helpful way to understand four distinct causal architectures (1a, 1b,
2a, 2b) and two types of causal complexity–(1b) multicausality and (2b) causal heterogeneity–as
outlined in figure 1. In this figure, each causal architecture has to do with how “simple” or “com-
plex” causal factors are with respect to some specified effect of interest.5 This figure shows how
each of these four architectures are related to each other and how they come apart. As monocausal-
3As Insel et al. state, “[h]istory shows that predictable problems arise with early, descriptive diagnostic
systems designed without an accurate understanding of pathophysiology. Throughout medicine, disorders
once considered unitary based on clinical presentation have been shown to be heterogeneous...Conversely,
history also shows that syndromes appearing clinically distinct may result from the same etiology” (Insel
et al., 2010).
4This mirrors a strategy that originated with classical genetics, which involves starting from a phenotype
and searching for its genetic causes (“forward genetics”), as opposed to starting from gene variants and
searching for their effects (“reverse genetics”) (Lawson and Wolfe, 2011).
5In other words, they have to do with simplicity and complexity at the level of causes (given some effect)
and not at the level of an effect (given some cause).
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ity and multicausality have to do with the number of causes for a single instance of disease, they
operate at the token-level. They represent two sides of the spectrum for token causal etiology–one
more complex (1b) and the other less so (1a). As causal homogeneity and causal heterogeneity
have to do with whether causes are similar or different across cases of disease, they operate at the
type or population level. These also represent two sides of a spectrum, but in this case for type
causal etiology–one more complex (2b) and the other less so (2a). These token (1a, 1b) and type
(2a, 2b) level causal architectures are not mutually exclusive. Knowing that a type-level disease
trait is causally heterogeneous or homogeneous provides no information about whether its instances
are multicausal or monocausal, and vice versa.6 The category that a disease falls into on the left
side of figure 1 does not dictate or influence which category it falls into on the right side (and
vice versa). Diseases that meet the less complex causal architectures (1a, 2a) come with particular
advantages, while diseases that meet the more complex ones (1b, 2b) involve various challenges for
understanding, explanation, classification, and control. I discuss these types of causal complexity
in more detail, the various challenges that they present, and how scientists work to overcome these
challenges.
3 Multicausality. As briefly described above, multicausality can be thought of as contrasting
with monocausality or the well-known “monocausal model” of disease. The former involves a
disease instance that has many causes, while the latter involves a disease instance that has one main
cause. Various conditions are thought to fit this monocausal picture, such as scurvy, tuberculosis,
chicken pox, giardiasis, and Huntington’s disease, among others. Genetic conditions that fit this
monocausal model are often referred to as “single-gene,” “monogenic,” or “Mendelian” diseases,
as opposed to diseases that are “polygenic” or “complex” (Cooper et al., 2013; Kendler, 2005;
Torkamani et al., 2018; Mitchell, 2012). What does it mean to say that these diseases each have
single main causes? How could any disease have a single main cause? Addressing these questions
requires specifying what is meant by “causation” and how one factor could be privileged as the
main or most important cause of some outcome. In this paper, I rely on an interventionist account
of causation, in which a causal factor “makes a difference” to its effect in the sense of providing
control over it.(Woodward, 2003). On this account, to say that C is a cause of D means that an
intervention that changes the values of C, and no other variables in background circumstances B,
6In other words, knowing that a single instance of some disease is multicausal or monocausal provides no
information about whether all instances of the disease are causally heterogeneous or homogeneous. A
disease that is monocausal and causally homogeneous is a disease that has a single main cause, where this
cause produces all cases of the population-wide disease. These diseases fit the standard “hard” medical
model and they include examples such as scurvy, tuberculosis, Huntington’s disease, and chicken pox, to
name a few. A disease that is monocausal and causally heterogeneous is one in which a single main cause
produces each instance of the disease (moncausality), but different single causes produces distinct cases of
the same disease (causal heterogeneity). A disease can be multicausal and causally homogeneous if each
instance of the disease is caused by multiple factors (multicausality), but the same combination of factors
cause every instance of the disease (causal homogeneity). Phenylketouria (PKU) is an example of this,
because two factors cause each instance of the disease (multicausality) and the same two factors cause all
cases of the disease (causal homogeneity). Finally, a disease can be multicausal and causally heterogeneous if
each instance of the disease is caused by many factors (multicausality), but their are different combinations
of causal factors that produce distinct instances of the disease (causal heterogeneity). These points are
discussed in more detail throughout the paper.
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Figure 1: Four different causal architectures (1a, 2a, 1b, 2b) and two different types of causal
complexity (1b, 2b).
produces changes in the values of D. In other words, causes are factors that operate like handles or
switches in the sense that they can be potentially manipulated to provide control over their effects.
Manipulating these factors produces changes in the effects they are related to. Importantly, this
account does not require that such an intervention is currently or technologically available, but just
that if such an intervention were performed, the ensuing change in the effect variable would occur
(Woodward, 2003, 11). Notice that for the diseases mentioned above, each has a particular factor
such that if that factor were manipulated, it would control the occurrence and nonoccurrence of the
disease in question. For example, manipulating dietary vitamin C provides control over whether a
patient acquires scurvy or not. The same could be said for interventions on the single main causes
of the other monocausal diseases mentioned above.7 Manipulating these factors provides control
over the occurrence and nonoccurrence of these disorders–they are targeted in treating, preventing,
explaining, and controlling these diseases.
These monocausal diseases have another important feature. The particular factors that are
identified as the single main causes of these diseases have a special type of control over them.8
These factors have probable control over disease traits in the sense that manipulating these causes
provides a high probability of producing the occurrence and nonoccurrence of the trait.9 In order to
see this, consider a light switch on a wall and the different degrees of probable control it can exhibit
over the state of the light being “on” or “off.” In a first system, flipping a switch up provides a %60
chance that the light turns “on,” while flipping it down provides a %60 percent chance that the
7These include manipulations of the tubercle bacteria, chicken pox virus, Giardia parasite, and huntingtin
gene variant, respectively.
8They actually have many special types of control over disease (Ross, ), but I focus on one type that helps
clarify what is meant by multicausality.
9This notion of probable causal control is similar to Cheng’s notion of “causal power” (Cheng, 1997).
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light turns “off.” In a second system, flipping the switch up provides nearly a %100 percent chance
that the light turns “on,” while flipping it down provides nearly a %100 percent chance of the
light turning “off.” The switch in the second system has a higher degree of probable control over
the light than the first, because manipulating this switch provides a higher likelihood of changing
(or controlling) the state of the light. Paradigmatic monocausal diseases approximate the second
switch system. Factors that are identified as the single main causes of these diseases provide a
high degree of probable control over them. This can be seen in Huntington’s disease, which is
caused by a mutation in the huntingtin gene. When a patient has this mutation her likelihood of
acquiring the disease is nearly 100% and if she lacks the mutation her likelihood of not acquiring
it is nearly 100%. Identifying single causes with a high degree of probable control is very valuable
in medicine. These factors provide a reliable indication of whether a disease will manifest or not
and they identify factors that can be targeted to control, explain, treat, and prevent disease.
Determining whether a single factor has probable control over a disease involves assessing poten-
tial background conditions that may also influence the disease outcome. Paradigmatic monocausal
diseases have single causes with probable control, where this control is stable across changes in
common or relevant background conditions. For example, as Kendler states “[i]f you have one copy
of the pathogenic gene for Huntington’s disease, it does not matter what your diet is, whether your
parents were loving or harsh, or if your peer group in adolescence were boy scouts or petty criminals.
If you have the mutated gene and you live long enough, you will develop the disease” (Kendler,
2005, 394). In other words, there are no additional genetic, environmental, or other factors that
influence or alter the cause-effect relationship in question (Kendler, 2005, 397).
The stability of this probable control is related to the genetic concepts of penetrance and effect
size.10 Penetrance refers to the percentage of individuals in a population with a particular genotype
who exhibit the corresponding phenotype, where phenotype is either present or absent. If a gene
variant is 30% penetrant, then 30% of those individuals with the genotype will express the phe-
notype. Alternatively, the variant that causes HD is 100% penetrant–or “fully” and “completely”
penetrant–because 100% of those individuals with this gene variant will express this disease phe-
notype (Stewart et al., 2007). This measure can be thought of as giving an indication of a gene’s
ability to “penetrate through to the phenotype” despite changes in other background factors (Carr,
2014). In this sense, complete or high penetrance refers to “determinative” genes for which “en-
vironmental and other factors have little effect on the phenotype” (Weiss, 2007; Carr, 2014, 283).
Probable control is also related to the genetic concept of “effect size,” which concerns the proportion
of variation in the phenotype that is “explained by” or “attributed to” variation in the genotype
(Nakagawa and Cuthill, 2007; Maier et al., 2017). Effect size is often described as capturing the
“magnitude of an effect” that genotype has over phenotype and it is often used synonymously with
the notion of “heritability” (Nakagawa and Cuthill, 2007, 593)(Maier et al., 2017). Genes that are
considered the single main causal factor for a phenotype often have large effect sizes. In these cases,
variation in the population-wide phenotype is explained by variation in a gene.
In the early stages of GWAS, researchers were hoping to identify gene variants with a high
degree of probable causal control, a high degree of penetrance, and large effect sizes. Instead, GWAS
uncovered nearly the opposite type of finding. These studies identified gene variants with a low
degree of probable control, little penetrance, and small effect sizes. In other words, they identified
10The fact that this probable control holds across a wide range of background conditions is also related to
Woodward’s notion of stability (Woodward, 2010) and Kender’s notion of non-contingency of association
(Kendler, 2005).
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genes that were “packing much less of a phenotypic punch than expected” (Goldstein, 2009, 1696).
When researchers find single gene variants with low probable control, variable penetrance, or small
effect sizes they often interpret this as an indication that other causal factors–such as other genes,
environmental variables, etc.–influence and interact with these variants in producing the disease
(Griffiths et al., 2008, 249). This is to say that they view these diseases as multicausal–as produced
by many causal factors that work together in aggregate to produce the condition.11 Instead of
having a single gene that fully “penetrates” through to the disease trait, these genes depend on
and interact with other causes in producing the trait. As Cooper states, “most carriers of the
risk alleles discovered by genome-wide association studies (GWAS) may never develop the disease
in question...because these variants generally only make a small contribution to the multifactorial
aetiology of the condition” (Cooper et al., 2013, 1078). Researchers expect disease etiology to
include factors with a high degree of probable control over disease. When a single causal factor
fails to provide this type of control, they search for multiple factors that provide this type of control
together. In these cases, the disease is considered multicausal as it is produced by many causes that
all have a “collective impact” on the disease outcome (Ideker et al., 2011, 3). A simple example of
this is phenylketonuria (PKU), which is caused by two main factors–a gene variant and a dietary
factor. Acquiring this disease requires the presence of both of these factors and both are required
to gain probable control over the disease state (Murphy, 1997, 113). Manipulating the variant only
provides control over the disease when the dietary factor is present and manipulating the dietary
factor only provides control when the gene is present. In this sense, PKU is multicausal because it
takes more than one causal factor to gain probable control over the occurrence and nonoccurrence
of this disease.12
This clarifies the rationale behind identifying a disease as monocausal versus multicausal. The
number of relevant causal factors is determined on the basis of the number it takes to achieve a high
degree of probable causal control over the disease trait. In this sense, the results of GWAS further
support the view that most psychiatric diseases are multicausal in etiology (Price et al., 2015). As
Plomin and Kovas state “it is now generally accepted that genetic influence on common disorders is
caused by multiple genes of small effect size rather than a single gene of major effect size” (Plomin
and Kovas, 2005, 600). Researchers do not deny that monocausal diseases exist, they just think
that most of them have already been identified. In other words, diseases with single genetic causes
that have “large effect sizes–the low-hanging fruit–have already been detected” (Park et al., 2010,
570). What we have left are more complicated multicausal diseases that are much more challenging
to discover and understand. As Goldstein states, “[t]he modest size of genetic effects detected so
far confirms the multifactorial aetiology of these conditions and suggests that complex diseases
will require substantially greater research effort to detect additional genetic influences” (Goldstein,
2009, 9).
How exactly does multicausality challenge scientific efforts to understand and explain these
diseases? A first challenge with this type of causal complexity it that it requires identifying the many
causal factors involved in producing an effect. Where providing a causal explanation of some effect
involves identifying and citing its causes, this becomes more and more difficult as the number of
relevant causes increases. More explanatorily relevant causal factors, means more factors to identify
11Discussions of this type of causal complexity are found in the philosophical literature. This is seen in
Mitchell’s discussion of situations where there are “multiple causes additively or interactively contributing
to the production of a major effect” (Mitchell, 2008, 24).
12For more on this see: Ross (Forthcoming).
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and appeal to. Furthermore, most psychiatric diseases do not appear to be similar to PKU in the
sense of having only two main causes. Researchers hypothesize that some psychiatric diseases have
hundreds of causally relevant gene variants, representing a far more extreme case of multicausality
than PKU. Second, it is not enough to simply identify these factors–these explanations require
providing some coherent story about how all of these factors work together to produce the disease
in question. This includes specifying how various factors depend on each other in producing disease,
what role they play in the pathogenic process, and what their particular effect sizes are. A third
main challenge with this type of causal complexity is that scientists appear to be unsatisfied by
explanations that are too multicausal. In cases where multicausal genetic factors balloon out to
an extreme degree, scientists often suggest that these factors fail to capture the right “level” of
“causal action” for the disease (Kendler, 2013, 1060). When this happens in the context of genetics,
researchers can claim that such causes provide little guidance or understanding and that there is
likely some alternative “level” that better captures the relevant causal etiology. This is mentioned
by Goldstein who states “[i]f effect sizes were so small as to require a large chunk of the genome to
explain the genetic component of a disorder, then no guidance would be provided: in pointing at
everything, genetics would point at nothing” (Goldstein, 2009, 1696). This third challenge is that
multicausality in the extreme is inadequate for explanation and that it suggests that the causally
relevant factors are likely found at some “level” other than molecular biology. This is driven by the
expectation that the right level or characterization of causal etiology should be somewhat unified
and not too splintered.
If multicausallity poses these challenges to understanding and explanation, how do scientists
overcome them? First, the challenge of identifying many causal factors has been approached, in
part, by modifying search methods such that they are better equipped to identify causes with small
effect sizes (Park et al., 2010). The second challenge–providing a coherent story about how these
factors work together–is addressed by various strategies aimed at unification. Here the unification is
focused on interaction and specifying how causes are unified on the basis of all interacting together
in a single causal process that produces disease. This is sometimes accomplished by providing a
“unifying” mechanism or pathway that integrates all causes with respect to the effect of interest.
These unifying causal processes can clarify how the many causes interact with each other, the step-
by-step or sequential order of their operation, and the magnitude of their individual effects over
the outcome of interest. For example, this can be done by identifying “multiple related genes in
the same functional pathway...[that]...work together to confer disease susceptibility” (Wang et al.,
2010). When gene variants are unified in this way it can allow for the identification of single,
unified causal processes at higher “levels.” For example, multiple gene variants may all influence a
higher-level cellular process, where this process captures how they all interact to produce disease.
This move to a higher-level can circumvent the issue of rampant multicausality at the level of gene
variants. Instead of appealing to many lower-level splintered causes, this provides the option of
citing a single, unified, and coherent higher-level causal process. This strategy of unification can be
understood as reworking or converting a situation of “many” causes into a situation in which “one”
cause or causal process is responsible. This converts “many” causes into “one” causal process,
in which this process is typically a single mechanism or pathway. In the context of explaining a
particular effect, this suggests that there is something useful about ascribing causal responsibility
to a single, causal entity as opposed to pointing to some distributed set of seemingly unrelated
factors.
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4 Causal heterogeneity. A second type of causal complexity in this domain is causal het-
erogeneity, which contrasts with causal homogeneity. Starting with the later, causal homogeneity
refers to a situation where distinct instances of the same effect (in this case a disease trait) are pro-
duced by the same combination of causes. In other words, these causes are “homogeneous” across
different instances of the same type of effect. Many diseases that fit the monocausal model provide
straightforward examples of this causal architecture. This can be seen in the case of scurvy because
every instance of this disease is caused by the same factor (namely, a deficiency of dietary vitamin
C). Causal homogeneity can also be met by multicausal diseases, so long as every instance of the
disease is produced by the same combination of causes. An example of this is PKU, because every
instance of this disease is caused by the same two factors. This shows how causal homogeneity is
distinct from monocausality and multicausality. While monocausality and multicausality have to
do with the number of causes for each instance of an effect, causal homogeneity has to do with
whether these causes are similar or different across all of these instances.
In modern medicine, there are particular assumptions about disease causation that involve
causal homogeneity. In particular, there is a common default assumption that in order for a dis-
ease trait to be “valid” and “legitimate” it should be causally homogeneous in the sense of having
some shared causal etiology (Ross, 2018). This notion of shared etiology is sometimes referred to
as a “disorder-specific pathophysiology” (Caspi and Moffitt, 2006, 586), a “shared causal process”
(Zachar, 2014, 87), a “shared pathogenesis,” or the “causal signature” for a particular disease
(Murphy, 2006, 105). As these shared causes capture what unifies various instances under the same
disease heading, they are referred to as “unifying cause[s]” or the “unifying theoretical underpin-
ning” for a given disease (Egger, 2012, 1). In current medical theory, it is often expected that
diseases have some unifying and singular causal story–that they have “single biological essences”
at the level of etiology (Kendler, 2012, 1). The presence of this assumption about shared causal
etiology is seen in various medical contexts. It figures in decisions about what are deemed “valid”
disease traits and how such traits and their etiologies should be discovered. For example, in the
context of psychiatry, “diagnostic validity” is defined in terms of shared causal etiology. In particu-
lar, “diagnostic validity” is “shorthand to signify definitions that capture families of closely related
disorders with similar pathophysiology” (Hyman, 2010, 162). Additionally, this assumption figures
in GWAS and other studies that aim to discover disease and disease etiology. This is because such
studies group together patients with similar symptomology in the hope of finding some causal pro-
cess that they all share or have in common. As Maeir states, “[m]ost genetic studies are based on
the assumption that individuals who exhibit similar symptoms or who have been diagnosed with
the same disease are representatives of the same underlying biology defined by a common genetic
architecture” (Maier et al., 2017, emphasis added). These strategies assume that distinct instances
of the same disease are all produced by similar or homogeneous causes.
Although causal homogeneity has figured into the set up and expectations of GWAS, many
purported disease traits have failed to meet this standard. Emerging results suggest that some psy-
chiatric diseases are causally heterogeneous–or exhibit “etiological heterogeneity”–in the sense that
distinct instances of the same disease are caused by different combinations of causal factors.13 Psy-
chiatric disorders that are thought to exhibit this type of causal complexity include schizophrenia,
autism spectrum disorder, and bipolar disorder (Betancur, 2011; Takahashi, 2013). Causal hetero-
13In other words, “[e]tiologic heterogeneity refers to a phenomenon that occurs in the general population
when multiple groups of disease cases, such as breast cancer clusters, exhibit similar clinical features, but
are in fact the result of differing events or exposures” (Hernandez and Blazer, 2006, 46).
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geneity is also present in other non-psychiatric (or physical medicine) diseases.14 An example of
this causal architecture is seen in Parkinson’s disease, which can be produced by different causal
factors in different patients with this same disease. This disease can be produced by single gene
variants (C1), single environmental factors (C2), and combinations of genetic and environmental
factors (C3) (Nandipati and Litvan, 2016). In cases where the heterogeneous causes are genetic the
disease is referred to as “genetically heterogeneous” (Barondes, 1992, 299). In this sense, “[g]enetic
heterogeneity can be defined as mutations at two or more genetic loci that produce the same or
similar phenotypes (either biochemical or clinical)” (McGinniss and Kaback, 2013, 7).15 An ex-
ample of this is retinitis pigmentosa, which can be caused by anywhere from 75-300 different gene
mutations that can each “act alone” to produce the disease (Hyman, 2010, 163).
A key feature of causal heterogeneity is that it involves a many-to-one relationship between
disease causes and the disease effect. In the context of genetically heterogeneous traits, this results
in a “phenotypic convergence of independent mutations” that can involve “diverse genetic pathways
to similar disease traits” or to some “common symptomology” (Hyman, 2010, 163) (Takahashi,
2013, 648). This is a kind of funneling of different causal factors or pathways onto the same final
effect of interest. The causal starting points of this funnel are often described as each individually
sufficient or able to “act alone” in producing the final disease outcome (Hyman, 2010, 163). In the
context of genetics, this ability to act alone is captured by the fact that each heterogeneous variant
is “highly penetrant” for the disease. We see this in the case of retinitis pigmentosa where “each
deleterious mutation acts as a single gene ‘Mendelian’ disorder within a family, but in aggregate,
different families are affected by a large number of distinct mutations in different genes” (Hyman,
2010, 163). In these cases, the heterogeneous genetic causes are sometimes referred to as “rare
variants,” because the etiology can be so varied or heterogeneous that any causal variant only
occurs very “rarely,” sometimes only in those individuals of a single family. From the standpoint
of any particular heterogeneous gene variant, each can have a high probability of producing the
disease. However, from the standpoint of the population-wide disease trait, there is no single genetic
cause that is responsible for all instances of the disease. This shows up in the fact that these gene
variants have small effect sizes. Variation in any individual gene variant only explains a small
percentage of the variation in the population-wide trait. Some of this variation is explained by the
other gene variants that are also capable of producing the disease.
How does causal heterogeneity challenge efforts to understand and explain scientific phenomena?
A first challenge is that heterogeneous causes are limited in providing explanations of type-level
phenomena, because no single heterogeneous cause explains all instances of its type-level effect.
Heterogeneous causes are explanatorily and causally relevant to a fraction of all instances of their
effect as opposed to having this type of relevance to most or all of these instances. In order to see
this, consider the case of Parkinson’s disease, which has three different individually sufficient causes
(C1, C2, and C3). Appealing to any one of these causes (e.g. C1) would fail to provide an adequate
explanation of the population-wide disease trait, because no heterogeneous cause alone “makes a
difference” to all instances of this trait. Similarly, targeting one of these factors will fail to provide
14These include high blood pressure, hyperlipedimia, retinitis pigmentosa, Alzheimer’s disease, cystic fibrosis,
lipoprotein lipase and polycystic kidney disease.
15There is a further distinction between locus and allelic heterogeneity. Locus heterogeneity refers to mu-
tations at different loci (or in different genes) that are capable of producing the same outcome. Allelic
heterogeneity indicates that different mutations (or alleles) at the same gene produce the same outcome.
My analysis focuses on locus heterogeneity.
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causal control over most or all cases of this disease.16 This, of course, is because some instances of
the disease are caused by different causal factors entirely (e.g. C2, and C3).
17 Thus, one problem
for heterogenous causes is that they have causal relevance and control of “narrow scope” over the
type-level disease trait. Heterogeneous causes only “make a difference” to a narrow subset of all
cases of the disease and they are not causally or explanatorily relevant to most or all cases of the
population-wide disease trait.
Notice how this problem does not arise if a disease is causally homogeneous. For diseases that
have homogeneous causal factors, these factors can be targeted to explain all (or most) instances
of the disease at the population level. This is because homogeneous causes do “make a difference”
to all cases of the type-level effect. Homogeneous causes have causal and explanatory relevance of
“broad scope.” These causes can be targeted to explain a large percentage of all instances of the
population-wide trait. In addition to this explanatory advantage, this feature is also present in the
type of control that homogeneous causes have over type-level effects. Homogeneous causes can be
targeted to control, prevent, and cure, most or all instances of the disease in question. Again, this
is because most of these instances have the same set of causes or causal etiology. Instead of aiming
at a variety of heterogeneous causes, a single causal etiology can be targeted to achieve control over
the population-wide disease. This helps reveal why it is valuable to identify diseases that meet this
causal architecture and why there is a preference (and often assumption) that diseases have shared
causal etiologies. Homogeneous causes provide a means of explaining and potentially controlling
population-wide disease traits.
A second challenge posed by this type of causal complexity is that it introduces an additional
question to be answered. This additional question is: why do different causes all produce the
same effect? Something about this situation seem puzzling and in need of further explanation. We
find situations of causal heterogeneity puzzling because they conflict with a common intuition that
similar effects should have similar types of causes.18 When this assumption is not met, we expect
some further explanation for why this is the case. This puzzle is similar to cases of “universality”
in science, in which some “universal” behavior is produced or exhibited by systems with vastly
different microstructural or causal details (Batterman, 2002). For example, neurons with different
physical details can exhibit the same firing behavior and microstructually distinct fluids can all
exhibit similar features at their critical points (Ross, 2015; Batterman, 2002). We often find that
these cases are puzzling and in need of further explanation. We want to know how the same
behavior can be produced by systems with different microstructural details? This is similar to
asking how the same type of disease can be produced by different causes. Physicians and medical
researchers often expect complete disease explanations to provide some type of satisfying answer
to these questions.
Consider an objection to these purported challenges. I have suggested that heterogeneous causes
fail to explain population-wide effects because they have limited causal and explanatory relevance.
If this is so, why not just appeal to all of the heterogeneous causes for a population-wide disease
trait? Why not appeal to a disjunctive set of causal factors that together explain all (or most)
16As Stegenga states, targeting these causes can “at best improve the health of a subset of people” with the
disease in question (Stegenga, 2018, 67).
17However, notice that the control is uneven–C1 can be used to reliably cause disease, but not to reliability
prevent it. The causal framework that I rely on requires that causes have control over both contrasts of
the explanatory target–namely, the presence and absence of the disease.
18We see this assumption in (Hume, 1738), for example.
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cases of the disease? One issue with this purported solution is that there can be far too many
causes to make this a feasible approach. Recall that retinitis pigmentosa has anywhere from 75-300
causes and that some psychiatric disorders are thought to have many more. Expecting scientists to
appeal to such a long list of factors is not a practical or realistic expectation and it does not appear
to reflect actual biological practice. We do not find physicians and researchers explaining these
conditions by citing hundreds of distinct causal factors. Second, this makes gaining control over
the disease outcome much more difficult because of the vast number of causes that a treatment or
preventive strategy would need to target. Scientists explicitly mention this in the case of retinitis
pigmentosa: “[g]iven the large number of mutations that cause RP, strategies of gene therapy aimed
at correcting each individual mutation may be an overwhelming task” (Chang et al., 1993, 602).
They claim that finding some shared causal target “may be a much more practical approach because
it would be applicable to multiple mutations” and, thus, offer treatment for multiple cases of the
disease (Chang et al., 1993, 602). Third, this approach still fails to address the extra question raised
by this causal architecture–namely, why do different causes all produce the same effect? Citing a
disjunctive set of causes does not provide an answer to this question.
How do scientists address the challenges associated with causal heterogeneity? A first approach
involves continuing to searching for some shared causal etiology that unifies the seemingly disparate
heterogeneous causes. One way of doing this involves identifying a “final common pathway” that
the upstream heterogeneous causes all converge on and operate through in producing the disease
of interest. In this case, the convergence point of the final common pathway identifies some shared
causal etiology for the disease. This shared etiology can be targeted to explain, control, and treat all
(or most) cases of the population wide disease trait. For example, researchers hypothesize that the
process of apoptosis (or regulated cell death) may be the final common pathway for the genetically
heterogeneous disease retinitis pigmentosa (Chang et al., 1993, 595). In light of this hypothesis,
they suggest that apoptosis “is a logical target for intervention for a variety of retinal degenerations”
(Chang et al., 1993, 601). Targeting this final common pathway would provide a way of treating
many cases of retinitis pigmentosa, no matter what their most upstream genetic causes are. This
approach has another advantage. It provides an answer to the question of why different causes
produce the same effect. In this case, the explanation for this is that the many different causes all
funnel through the same causal process, which ultimately leads to the singular effect of interest.
This final common pathway identifies causes that do “make a difference” to all (or most) cases of
the disease in question and causes that can be targeted to explain, predict, and control all or most
cases of the disease at the population-level. Alternatively, when a shared causal etiology can not
be found, a second approach is used. This second approach involves dividing up and redefining
the disease trait on the basis of the heterogeneous causes. Thus, when researchers discovered that
Parkinson’s disease is caused by three different individually sufficient causes, some suggested that
“there is no single Parkinson disease” and that this category represents “several different diseases”
(Weiner, 2008, 705)(Stayte and Vissel, 2014, 18). Both of these solutions restore causal homogeneity
and the shared causal etiology standard. Furthermore, this second strategy reveals what means
medical researchers and physicians are willing to go to meet the causal homogeneity and shared
causal etiology standards. They are willing to completely redefine disease traits.
5 Disease discovery and causation: A final complicating feature. These four causal
architectures provide categories and distinctions that can apply to scientific contexts more generally.
They specify four different ways that causal factors can relate to an effect of interest. However,
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there are aspects of this paper’s analysis that pertain to medicine more exclusively. These aspects
have to do with the fact that disease traits are often defined on the basis of their causes, while
this is not always the case for other phenomena in science. This relates to an additional type of
complexity involved in disease discovery and causation that deserves mention.
Recall the two step process for disease discovery, mentioned in section 2. The first step involves
specifying some disease trait and its symptomology (D), while the second step involves searching
for the causal factors (C) that produce this trait. In this sense, “discovering” a disease involves
uncovering both its symptomology and causal etiology. In addition to this discovery process, recall
that the gold standard for defining disease traits involves defining them on the basis of their causes.
Disease categories are expected to meet particular causal requirements. Diseases are defined on the
basis of factors that (i) provide causal control over the disease and that (ii) capture shared causal
etiologies at the population level. If these conditions are not met, the legitimacy of the disease trait
is questioned. Given this set up, consider the resulting dilemma. In order to search for the causes
of a disease trait–and follow the established process of disease discovery–the trait in question first
needs to be specified and defined. However, you cannot follow the gold standard way of defining
the disease, because this requires knowing what its causes are and this is exactly what you are
searching for. This captures a kind of catch-22 situation: you need to define diseases in order to
search for their causes, but the best definitions of disease are supposed to reflect their causes. In
other words, you need to define (D) to find (C), but the best definitions of (D) are supposed to
reflect (C).
This situation forces psychiatrists and researchers to propose “best-guess” definitions of disease
traits at the first step, before etiology is known at all. This captures how most of our current
psychiatric disorders are conceptualized. The hope is that these “best-guesses” will define diseases
in ways that track causes that meet various causal requirements (i, ii) for disease. However, there
is absolutely no guarantee that they will be able to do this. In fact, not only is there no guarantee
of this, but the researchers’ ability to ultimately find these causes is highly dependent on the
first guess that they make. They might choose to define a disease by symptom clusters that have
heterogeneous causes and that lack any shared causal etiology. If this is the case, it will be much
harder to identify the shared causal process that produces this disease, if none exists. As Hyman
states, if researchers “select study populations according to a system that is a poor mirror of nature,
it is very hard to advance our understanding of psychiatric disease” (Casey et al., 2013, 810). In
this sense, discovering these diseases is highly is dependent on this first choice and on how diseases
are initially defined. However, as captured in the dilemma above, this choice often needs to be
made without knowing what the disease causes are.
Part of what this reveals is how disease classification influences causal discovery. Classification
dictates where we shine the spot light in searching for causes. If diseases are initially defined in ways
that do not track shared causal etiologies then this can complicate efforts to identify their causes.
No matter how much you search among this group of patients, no shared causal process for their
symptoms will be found, because none exists.19 There are worries that the current classification
system in psychiatry–the diagnostic and statistical manual of mental disorders (DSM)–has defined
diseases in ways that impede efforts to uncover their etiologies. In particular, there are worries
that “these categories, based upon presenting signs and symptoms, may not capture fundamental
underlying mechanisms of dysfunction” (Insel et al., 2010, 748). This leads researchers to refer
19This relates to the assumption that DSM categories group together patients with some shared biological
properties. Tabb refers to as the “assumption of diagnostic discrimination” (Tabb, 2015, 1048).
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to DSM disease categories as “diagnostic silos” and “epistemic blinders” that have not facilitated
causal discovery, yet continue to be used in searching for it (Hyman, 2010) (Casey et al., 2013,
811). Researchers worry that the continued use of these invalided and “fictive” categories threatens
to reify them as they continue to be used in diagnosis and experimental work (Casey et al., 2013,
811)(Hyman, 2010)(Morris and Cuthbert, 2012). Of course, we do not have proof that these
categories lack shared causal etiologies–it may be that we just have not found them yet. However,
the more we try to find these causes and the longer we go without making progress, the less likely
this option seems.
Are there other ways to make progress in uncovering the etiologies of psychiatric disease? How
should the field move forward? Some researchers caution against an approach of simply “replacing
old flawed guesses with new guesses about disorder definitions” (Hyman, 2010, 171). It is not clear
that our next guess will be any better or that this approach is ideal for psychiatric disease. Another
way forward involves inverting the disease discovery process. Instead of starting with an effect and
searching for its causes, this solution involves starting with causes and searching for their effects.
This strategy has been associated with the newer research domain criteria (RDoC) framework. This
framework creates a “new kind of taxonomy for mental disorders” that focuses first on phenomena
(or constructs) at different levels of analysis and only then on the disorders they link up with (Insel
and Lieberman, 2013). These levels of analysis include functional assessments of constructs at the
level of genes, molecules, cells, neural circuits, physiology, behaviors, and self-reports (Morris and
Cuthbert, 2012, 31). The hope is that by starting with more concrete physical processes helpful
classifications might begin to emerge–classifications that may point to new disease divisions that
are imperceptible within the current DSM framework. Instead of being constrained by DSM disease
definitions, RDoC starts with potential functional impairments and tracks what downstream disease
category they may lead to. As Casey et al. state “[a] main way in which the RDoC project will
influence neuroscience research is that rather than taking a diagnostic group and attempting to
discover its underlying neurobiological basis, the RDoC approach uses our current understanding
of behaviour–brain relationships as the starting point and relates these to clinical phenomenology”
(Casey et al., 2013). This allows researchers to start with potential upstream causes and search
downstream for the effects, or disease categories, that they lead to.
While RDoC involves an inversion of the traditional disease discovery process it is likely that
progress in unveiling the etiologies of psychiatric disease will involve more of a back-and-forth
process. Researchers might start with causal factors, search for their effects and change how they
isolate causes on the basis of what they find. Alternatively, they might start with a new disease
category, search for its causes, and redefine the category on the basis of what they uncover. Where
the goal is to link up particular causal processes with particular disease definitions, researchers will
likely toggle back-and-forth between both causes and effects until they find the right match.
6 Conclusion. This paper has clarified four causal architectures and two types of causal com-
plexity that are common in psychiatric genetics. Multicausality and causal heterogeneity capture
distinct types of complexity at the level of disease causation. This paper has examined how these
types of causal complexity should be understood, how they challenge disease explanation, and
how scientists are working to overcome these challenges. While aspects of this analysis pertain to
biomedicine more specifically, these four causal architectures are likely to provide general categories
and distinctions that apply to scientific contexts more broadly.
This analysis provides a different way to understand common claims that psychiatry is in a
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“crisis.” First, it helps to clarify why explanation in psychiatry is difficult, without suggesting that
psychiatric diseases are “intractable,” “enigmatic,” or beyond scientific understanding. In fact,
this analysis reveals how scientific progress is being made in this domain. It reveals the sound
methodologies that guide efforts to discover, understand, and explain psychiatric diseases, and it
indicates that these methodologies are found in other medical subfields. Relatedly, it shows that
these types of complexity are not unique to psychiatry, but that they are found in other areas of
medicine. This is seen in disease examples such as PKU and retinitis pigmentosa, which exhibit
multicausality and causal heterogeneity, respectively, despite being viewed as physical medicine or
non-psychiatric diseases. Instead of being viewed as a defunct discipline in “crisis,” psychiatry is
better understood as a field that is at the forefront of disease discovery and that seeks to uncover and
shed light on some of the more challenging diseases that confront all of medicine.20 In many ways
psychiatric is a “safe haven” for diseases of unknown etiology–it provides a place for these diseases to
be taken seriously, scrutinized, and modified, so that they can be fairly judged on the basis of various
foundational standards in modern medicine. The constant push for etiological understanding in
psychiatry leads researchers in this area to explicitly reflect on the abstract principles that diseases
are expected to meet–why such principles are important and when (if ever) they should be relaxed.
These reflections reveal standards and methodologies that are not just found in psychiatry, but
that are present throughout medicine more generally.
20Ironically, although psychiatry is sometimes criticized for only housing diseases of unknown etiology, once
the etiology of some “psychiatric” conditions are uncovered, the resulting disease is relocated to another
area of medicine, such as neurology. This has occurred with various forms of dementia, which are now
considered “neurologic” as opposed to “psychiatric” in nature. This can prevent psychiatry from receiving
full credit for disease discovery. It seems unreasonable to criticize psychiatry for only (or mainly) dealing
with diseases of unknown etiology, while at the same time recognizing that diseases are removed from this
field once their etiologies are uncovered.
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